Part of Memorandum of the ASAS
The attitude towards the economic backwardness of Serbia shows that vindicative policy towards it has not weakened during the time. On the contrary, feeding itself with its success, it became increasingly powerful in order to definitely be expressed in genocide. The discrimination of citizens of Serbia is politically unacceptable, by which, due to the representation of republics by parity, it is smaller than the representation of others in positions of officials and federal delegates in the Federal Assembly, and the vote of Serbian voters is less valid than that of any other republic or province. In this light, Yugoslavia has not expressed itself as a community of equal citizens, or of equal nations and nationalities, as a community of all equal territories. Nevertheless, this equality is not valid for Serbia due to its special legal-political position that intends to keep the Serbian people under permanent control. The main idea of such policy was weak Serbia, strong Yugoslavia', that advanced to an influential opinion: if Serbia, as the largest nation, were allowed an accelerated economic development, it would become dangerous to other nations. Therefore, all the possibilities have been used to put as great limits as possible to its economic development and political consolidation. One of those very acute limits is the present undefined position and abundant in internal constitutional conflicts of Serbia.
By the Constitution of 1974, Serbia in fact was divided into three parts. The autonomous provinces became equal to republics in every aspect, they were not defined as states only and do not have the same number of their representatives in some federal bodies.
...The present fate of Kosova is not complicated' any more, and it cannot be limited by vain, indirect and skilful estimations, by generalised platforms - but in short, it is a matter of Yugoslav consequences! Between the provincial segregation that has become increasingly exclusive and federal arbitrages, that have only paralysed anything else, often the urgent measures - an intertwining of unsolved situations is being closed in the circle of unsolved questions. The fate of Kosova has become the vital question of the whole Serbian people. If it is not resolved with really right results of the imposed war, if real security and right equality are not established for all the peoples living in Kosova, if objective and permanent conditions are not created for the people who have emigrated to return there - this part of the Republic of Serbia and Yugoslavia will become a European question, with heavy and unpredicted consequences. Kosova presents one of the most important points of the internal Balkans. In conformity with ethnic profile of the Balkan Peninsula, ethnic mixing in many Balkan territories and the request for ethnically clean Kosova, that has been practically carried out, not only is a direct and harsh threat to all the peoples that are there in minority, but if this comes true, the wave of expansion that has begun will present a real and daily threat to all the peoples of Yugoslavia.
Kosova is not the only region in which the Serbian population is found under discrimination pressure. The absolute and not only relative decline of the number of Serbs in Croatia is a sufficient proof for such confirmation. According to the census of 1948, 543,795 or 14.48 per cent Serbs were in Croatia. According to the census of 1981, their number came down to 531,502, which was 11.5 per cent of the total number of population in Croatia. In 33 years in peace, the number of Serbs in Croatia was reduced, even in comparison with the post-war period, when the first census was done and when the consequence of the war to the number of Serbs was known.
Lika, Kordun and Bania remained the most undeveloped regions in Croatia, what caused the emigration of the Serbs to Serbia, and migrations to other parts of Croatia, where the Serbs, as a group of newcomers, minor and inferior in social viewpoint, were subjugated to assimilation. Actually, the Serbian population in Croatia has been subjected to refined assimilation. A constituent part of that policy was banning of all Serbian societies and cultural institutions in Croatia, that had a rich tradition from the time of Austria-Hungarians and Yugoslavia between the two wars, then forcing an official language on them, that is called by the name of the second nation (Croatian), personifying national equality in this way.
The existing depressive situation of the Serbian people, with increasingly higher occurrence of chauvinism and serbophobia in some environs, was to the advantage of revival of increasingly drastic appearance of national feeling of the Serbian population and reactions that could be caused and be dangerous. Our duty is not to close our eyes and underestimate those dangers for a single instant...
The reason why the citizens and working class have not been represented in the respective chambers of the Federal Assembly cannot be ascribed to favouring the national only, but also to the intention that Serbia should be put in an unequal position and in this way its political influence become weaker. But the greatest concern is that the Serbian people does not have a state, such as all the other peoples have. It is true that in article 1 of the Constitution of the SR of Serbia the provision says that Serbia is a state, but the question is what kind of state it is that is incompetent in its own territory and which has not means available to put order in a part of its region, to provide personal security and security of the property for all its citizens, to stop genocide in Kosova and to stop the emigration of the Serbs from their century-long hearths. Such a position indicates the discriminating policy towards Serbia, primarily if it is taken into consideration that the Constitution of SFRY imposed internal federalism as a permanent source of conflicts between the narrow Serbia and its provinces.